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Human languages employ constructions that tacitly assume specific properties of the limited
range of phenomena they evolved to describe. These assumed properties are true features of that
limited context, but may not be general or precise properties of all the physical situations allowed
by fundamental physics. In brief, human languages contain ‘excess baggage’ that must be qualified,
discarded, or otherwise reformed to give a clear account in the context of fundamental physics of
even the everyday phenomena that the languages evolved to describe. The surest route to clarity
is to express the constructions of human languages in the language of fundamental physical theory,
not the other way around. These ideas are illustrated by an analysis of the verb ‘to happen’ and
the word ‘reality’ in special relativity and the modern quantum mechanics of closed systems.
“Mind and world. . . have evolved together
and in consequence are something of a
mutual fit.”
— Wm. James, 1893 [1]
“We are deceived at every level by our
introspection.”
— F.H.C. Crick, 1979 [2]
I. INTRODUCTION
Human languages are features of particular kinds of
information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes)1,
living late in the universe, dwelling on a minor planet,
circling a garden-variety star, that is but one of about
ten billion stars in a galaxy, that is but one of about a
hundred billion other galaxies within the visible universe.
Human languages are thus features of our universe but
very special ones. Languages evolved over the history
of our species through a combination of frozen accidents
and selection by both physical and cultural evolutionary
pressures. Human languages are adapted to provide cer-
tain highly coarse-grained descriptions of the quasiclassi-
cal realm of everyday experience — the ‘world’ to which
James presumably referred in the above quote. Yet, hu-
man languages are not restricted to such quasiclassical
descriptions. Suitably extended, they also permit the
discussion of regimes under exploration in contemporary
fundamental physics that are characterized by concepts
that can be quite far from those native to the quasiclassi-
cal realm. This essay explores some aspects of the tension
between the domains in which human languages evolved
∗Dedicated to GianCarlo Ghirardi on his 70th Birthday.
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1 The term IGUS is broad enough to include both single represen-
tatives of biological species that have evolved naturally and cer-
tain kinds of mechanical devices. It includes human beings, both
individually and collectively as members of groups, cultures, and
civilizations. It includes intelligent beings that we might meet in
the future. For more discussion see [3]
and those to which they can be applied. In particular, we
have in mind applications to the modern quantum me-
chanics of closed systems, most generally the universe as
a whole. This deals not only with quasiclassical realms
but many mutually incompatible ones as well.
The theses of this essay are these: Human languages
employ constructions that tacitly assume properties of
the limited range of phenomena they evolved to de-
scribe. These assumed properties are true features of
that limited context, but may not be general proper-
ties of all the physical situations allowed by fundamen-
tal physics. In brief, human languages contain ‘excess
baggage’ that must be qualified, discarded, or otherwise
reformed to give a clear account in the context of funda-
mental physics of even the everyday phenomena that the
languages evolved to describe.
It is no more surprising to find that human language
contains tacit assumptions than it is to discover that we
possess a useless appendix. Indeed these limitations of
language are evidence for its evolution just as our ap-
pendix is evidence for human evolution. Rather, the im-
portant circumstance is that the flexible, open-ended, na-
ture of human language allows it to be employed in the
discussion of concepts very far from those it evolved to
describe with only a few precautions and modifications.
This essay is concerned with those precautions and mod-
ifications.
The surest route to clarity is to express the construc-
tions of human languages in the language of fundamen-
tal physical theory, not the other way around. Alter-
natively the constructions can be qualified so that tacit
assumptions are made explicit. By ‘human language’
here we mean roughly the language of everyday discourse.
By ‘language of physics’ we mean roughly the language,
terms, concepts, and mathematics found in physics text-
books. Making a precise general distinction will not be
necessary. because we will do that explicitly in specific
examples.
There are many different physical theories that could
be used to illustrate these theses, many different linguis-
tic constructions that could be considered, and certainly
many different human languages. For simplicity and clar-
2ity we shall focus on limited examples of each of these
possibilities.
We will consider just one human language — English
— and hope that our analysis of the connection between
English and physics extends to other human languages in
an essentially equivalent way. Assuming this equivalence
we shall refer just to ‘human language’ — singular rather
than plural.
We shall consider just two linguistic constructions.
The first is the use of the verb ‘to happen’ in its vari-
ous forms: ‘happened’, ‘is happening’, and ‘will happen’.
Other existential verbs ‘to be’, ‘to exist’, etc. may be
treated similarly. The other construction is the word ‘re-
ality’.
We shall consider just two theories: the quantum the-
ory of closed systems [3, 4, 5] and special relativity. Clar-
ifying the quantum mechanics of closed systems is the
objective of this essay. But special relativity provides a
simple, uncontroversial example.2
When we refer to ‘quantum mechanics’ or ‘quantum
theory’ in this essay, we mean the decoherent (or con-
sistent) histories quantum mechanics of closed systems,
most generally the universe [3, 4, 5]. This is a mod-
ern synthesis of the ideas of many that extends the work
begun by Everett. Decoherent histories quantum the-
ory is logically consistent, consistent with experiment as
far as is known, applicable to cosmology, consistent with
the rest of modern physics such as special relativity, and
generalizable to include quantum gravity (e.g. as in [7]).
In incorporates Copenhagen quantum theory as an ap-
proximation appropriate for measurement situations. It
may not be the only theory with these properties, but
is the most promising of those presently available in the
author’s opinion.
Briefly the discussion will be as follows: A conflict
arises between special relativity and the use of ‘hap-
pened’, ‘is happening’, and ‘will happen’ in human lan-
guage. These constructions tacitly assume that there is a
division of spacetime into past, present, and future. But
special relativity does not provide a unique such division,
but rather many of them. The resulting conflict can be
resolved by abandoning ‘to happen’ and using the lan-
guage of special relativity. Alternatively spacetime can
be conventionally divided into past, present, and future
and the use of ‘to happen’ qualified to refer to that con-
vention.
In quantum mechanics, ‘happened’, ‘is happening’, and
‘will happened’ are probabilistic statements to be qual-
ified with the relevant probability, e.g. ‘happened with
probability p’. These probabilities are constructed from
those that quantum mechanics assigns to a set of alter-
native histories of the universe. Human language tacitly
2 It should be noted that none of these considerations is necessary
to discuss the work of G. Ghirardi, our dedicatee, as for example
in [6].
assumes that there is a unique such set, mostly the histo-
ries of the quasiclassical realm. But quantum theory ex-
hibits many alternative sets of histories to describe past,
present and future which may be incompatible roughly
in the sense that position and momentum are incompat-
ible. The resulting conflict can be resolved by replac-
ing statements which involve ‘to happen’ with statements
about quantum mechanical probabilities. Alternatively,
‘to happen’ can be qualified to refer to the particular set
of histories which define those probabilities.
This essay is based on the author’s experience in ex-
plaining and teaching the quantum mechanics of closed
systems along with some modest reflection on the sub-
ject. It is intended for physicists as a practical guide
to a clearer understanding of this area by dealing with
some of the linguistic tangles that naturally arise. No
new physics is considered, only issues concerning the dis-
cussion of physics. The ideas expressed are merely the
author’s opinions on routes to clarity. Others may find
different routes work better. This essay is therefore not a
review of all that has been written on these questions. In
particular, there is a long history of discussion of related
questions in philosophy and linguistics, but this essay
does not pretend to address any of the deep issues that
may arise there (see, e.g.[8]).
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses
the use of ‘to happen’ in the context of special relativ-
ity. Section III discusses the use of ‘to happen’ in the
quantum mechanical context where there are many mu-
tually incompatible decoherent sets of coarse-grained al-
ternative histories of the universe. Section IV ventures
to discuss the implications of this for our notions of real-
ity. Section V discusses dispensible words and what to do
about them. Section VI concludes with practical advice
on achieving clarity.
II. SPACETIME
Up here, on length scales much greater than the Planck
length, the world is four-dimensional with a classical
spacetime geometry. There is neither a unique notion
of space nor a unique notion of time. Rather, from each
point in spacetime, there is a family of timelike directions
and three times as many spacelike directions. Spacetime
geometry is curved by mass-energy according to the laws
of general relativity, but in sufficiently small patches ev-
ery geometry is well-approximated by the flat spacetime
of special relativity. To simplify our discussion we begin
by restricting attention to a patch of spacetime where
this approximation holds.
First, recall a few basic facts about flat spacetime.
Events occur at points. At each point Q there is a light
cone consisting of two parts: The future light cone is the
three-dimensional surface generated by light rays emerg-
ing from Q. The past light cone is similarly defined by
light rays converging on Q. (The labels ‘past’ and ‘fu-
ture’ are conventional, but may be conveniently specified
3by the directions toward the big bang and away from it.)
Points inside the light cone of Q are timelike separated
from it; points outside it are spacelike separated.
The center of mass of a localized IGUS such as our-
selves describes a timelike world line whose points can
be labeled by the timelike distance along the curve also
known as proper time.
Consider an event A on your world line and another
event B elsewhere. Suppose you are located along your
world line at event A. Could you answer the questions:
‘Will B happen in the future?’; ‘Is B happening now?’;
and ‘Did B happen in the past?’ You cannot because
these questions are meaningless in special relativity with-
out further qualifications. The questions presume that
spacetime can be divided into past, present (now), and
future just on the basis of the location of A in spacetime.
There is no such division.
More specifically, imagine there are astronauts on Sat-
urn’s moon Titan. Questions like ‘What are the astro-
nauts doing now?’ or ‘Did they begin breakfast half an
hour ago?’ are meaningless without further qualifica-
tions. The light travel time between Titan and Earth
can be over an hour implying a comparable special rela-
tivistic ambiguity in the notion of simultaneity. There is
thus a conflict between familiar constructions of human
language and the facts of special relativity.
The simplest resolution of the conflict is to discard the
verbs like, ‘to happen’ and to formulate physically mean-
ingful questions in the language of physics. Questions
like ‘Is B in my future light cone at A?’, ‘Is B spacelike
separated from me at A?’, and ‘Is B in my past light cone
at A?’ do make sense and have unambiguous answers3.
Another route to resolving the conflict is to retain the
verb ‘to happen’ but to qualify its usage in some con-
ventional way. Specifically, we could divide spacetime up
into a spacelike surface S containing A, the future of S,
and the past of S. Then the questions ‘Will B happen
in the future of S?’, ‘Is B happening on S?’, and ‘Did
B happen in the past of S?’ do make sense and have
definite answers depending on where B is in spacetime.
They are made meaningful by the qualifications refer-
ring to the spacelike surface S. However, there are an
arbitrarily large number of spacelike surfaces containing
A and the answers to the questions can be different for
other spacelike surface S′ when B is spacelike separated
from A. Unqualified constructions involving ‘to happen’
are meaningless, when qualified they have many different
meanings4.
3 ‘Is’ here is understood in a tenseless, four-dimensional sense re-
ferring to the properties of spacetime. In a similar way ‘happen’
is sometimes used (mostly by physicists) in a four-dimentional
sense of occurring in spacetime. That usage won’t be discussed
in this essay but can be a further source of confusion.
4 Using the language of physics and employing appropriate qual-
ifications are not to only ways of resolving the conflict between
special relativity and human language. Raphael Sorkin tells the
Introducing a coordinate system in our patch of space-
time is another arbitrary way of fixing a convention to
give ‘to happen’ a qualified meaning. Riemann normal
coordinates based at the point A are a simple example if
they cover the whole patch. If the geometry of the patch
happens to be exactly flat, these reduce to a choice of a
particular Lorentz frame. Past, present, and future are
now defined by the timelike coordinate (call it t) being
greater, equal, or less than its value at A. As a bonus,
a coordinate system provides a convention for answering
further questions of the form ‘Does B occur before C
or afterward?’ which would be ambiguous if unqualified
when B and C are spacelike separated.
The satellites comprising the Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) are an example of a collective IGUS that ef-
fectively employs a coordinate system to define temporal
relations. Both the special relativistic effects arising from
the velocities of the satellites, and the general relativistic
effects arising from the slight curvature of spacetime in
the vicinity of the Earth are important for GPS opera-
tion [9]. The system would fail in about an hour if these
were not both accounted for. Precise agreement among
the satellites on a notion of simultaneity is needed. To
define that the GPS uses a version of a standard set of
coordinates for the weak field metric of general relativity,
centered in the Earth, with spatial axes pointing towards
fixed stars, and the time coordinate normalized so that
that on the Earth’s geoid (approximately the ocean sur-
face) it coincides with the time of clocks co-rotating with
the Earth there. It is unlikely that the satellites are em-
ploying the verb ‘to happen’ in any communication. But,
if they did, they could define it by the time of their ef-
fective coordinate system.
Human IGUSes were using constructions like ‘will hap-
pen’, ‘is happening’, and ‘did happen’ long before they
had accurate clocks, and certainly before there was a pre-
cise notion of coordinate system. How would the notion
of ‘present’ or ‘now’ that is implicit in these constructions
be described in the language of physics? The author has
discussed the physics of ‘now’ in [10]. The next few para-
graphs summarize some of these ideas.
Human IGUSes have an individual notion of ‘now’
which can be modeled as a feature of their conscious fo-
cus on their most recently acquired information. This is
already an approximate idea only defined up to the time
scale of human perception5 which we denote by τ∗. In-
dividual IGUSes can agree on ‘what is happening now’
by reporting their current observations and checking the
reports they receive against their individual notions of
‘now’. The result is an approximate, imprecise, common
author that there have been various proposals for reforming hu-
man language. These include redefining ‘now’ to mean ‘spacelike’
and using adverbs rather than verb forms to indicate tense, as
in ‘It happen spacelike.’ The author guesses that the two reso-
lutions discussed in the text have better chances of success.
5 This is of order .1s e.g [11].
4present useful in everyday circumstances.
Agreement on a common present can be reached by a
group of IGUSes in a patch where spacetime is approxi-
mately flat if the following contingencies are met:
1. The relative velocities of the IGUSes are small com-
pared to the velocity of light.
2. The light travel time between IGUSes in a Lorentz
frame in which they are nearly at rest is small com-
pared to the time scale τ∗ characterizing percep-
tion.
3. The time scale for perception τ∗ is short compared
to the time scales on which interesting features of
the IGUSes’ environment vary.
Contingency (2), based on (1), means special relativistic
ambiguities in the meaning of simultaneity are negligible
in the construction of a common present. Contingency
(3) means that the ambiguity in the ‘now’ of each IGUS
is negligible in this construction. Condition (1) means
that agreement can be reached over an interesting length
of time.
Under these contingencies, a collection of IGUSes can
construct a common present, but it is a present that is lo-
cal, approximate, and contingent on their relation to each
other and to their environment. All the contingencies are
easily satisfied for human IGUSes on Earth. However, as-
tronauts on Titan will not be able to participate in this
common ‘now’; contingency (2) will be violated. Further
conventions will be needed to use the verb ‘to happen’ in
talking to them.
The purpose of this section was not to analyze human
linguistic constructions in any detail. Rather, it was to
emphasize that certain of these constructions referring
to time are ambiguous even in the context of our un-
derstanding of the physics of spacetime through special
and general relativity. The existence of such ambigui-
ties is not surprising given that the language evolved to
describe limited and specific circumstances in which con-
ditions (1)- (3) hold. The language implicitly assumes
certain features of these limited circumstances summa-
rized roughly by the three contingencies above. The am-
biguities can be resolved either by replacing parts of the
human language with the language of physics, or by us-
ing that language to specify conventions that resolve the
ambiguity.
As our understanding of spacetime progresses to ever
more general contexts, the ambiguities in the use of hu-
man language can be expected to become larger. In a
quantum theory of gravity, there is no fixed spacetime ge-
ometry. Rather, geometry is a quantum variable, fluctu-
ating and without definite value. Then, even statements
like ‘This happened in my past light cone’ become mean-
ingless without further qualification. Beyond that, some
explorers expect that spacetime will only be an coarse-
grained phenomenon of some deeper level of description
[12]. How will ‘to happen’ be unambiguously defined
then?
III. THE QUANTUM MECHANICS OF CLOSED
SYSTEMS
A. A Model Universe
To keep the discussion manageable, we consider a
closed quantum system, most generally, the universe, in
the approximation that gross quantum fluctuations in the
geometry of spacetime can be neglected. The closed sys-
tem can then be thought of as a large (say >∼ 20,000
Mpc), perhaps expanding, box of quantum fields moving
in a fixed background spacetime. Everything is contained
within the box, in particular galaxies, planets, observers,
and observed (if any), measured subsystems, and the ap-
paratus that measures them. This is a model of the most
general physical context for prediction.
The fixed background spacetime means that the no-
tions of time are fixed and that the usual apparatus of
Hilbert space, states, and operators can be employed in a
quantum description of the box. The essential theoretical
inputs to the process of prediction are the Hamiltonian
H governing evolution and the initial quantum state |Ψ〉.
These are assumed to be fixed and given by fundamen-
tal theory. We assume that H , |Ψ〉, and the operators
representing alternatives can be described in terms of a
set of fundamental fields and their conjugate momenta.
For definiteness, we work in a fixed Lorentz frame whose
time is t.
All the special relativistic concerns regarding the use of
‘to happen’ discussed in Section II arise in this context,
but we resolve these by fixing the Lorentz frame in order
to concentrate on quantum mechanical issues.
For the reader not familiar with it, a simplified, bare-
bones account of the quantum mechanies of closed sys-
tems is given in Appendix A. However, very little of even
the modest detail given there is necessary for the present
discussion. The points essential for the present discussion
are these:
1. The assumed inputs are theories of the quantum
dynamics (H) and the quantum initial state (|Ψ〉).
2. The outputs are the probabilities of the individual
members of sets of alternative coarse-grained histo-
ries of the closed system. Consistent probabilities
are predicted only for sets of histories for which
there is negligible quantum interference between all
pairs of histories in the set as a consequence of H
and |Ψ〉. Such sets of histories are said to decohere
and are called realms for short.
3. There are no non-trivial completely fine-grained
realms. Coarse graining is therefore necessary for
decoherence. Some realms are compatible in the
sense that they can be related by the operations
of fine and coarse graining. But quantum theory
also exhibits incompatible realms. Two realms are
mutually incompatible if there is no common finer-
grained realm of which they are both coarse grain-
5ings. Realms defined by coarse grainings of incom-
patible variables such as position and momentum
provide simple examples.
4. Quasiclassical realms6 exhibit the regularities of
classical physics and in particular the approximate
correlations in time summarized by effective clas-
sical equations of motion. At a sufficiently fine-
grained level, quasiclassical realms are defined by
coarse grainings of familiar quasiclassical variables
such as averages of energy, momentum, an number
over suitable volumes. The quasiclassical realms of
everyday experience are a subset of the totality of
realms provided by quantum theory for a descrip-
tion of the universe.
5. Quantum theory does not distinguish between its
different realms, although IGUSes may distinguish
between them by their utility, as for example in the
almost exclusive focus of human IGUSes on quasi-
classical realms.
If any of this is not immediately clear, the reader should
consult Appendix A.
B. Probabilities
Probabilities are measures of ignorance in classical
physics, but in quantum physics they are fundamental.
This subsection is devoted to reconciling human lan-
guage which incorporates assumptions of classical cer-
tainty with a probabilistic fundamental theory. To this
end, we restrict the discussion of this subsection to one
realm. We begin by reviewing a little notation explained
more fully in Appendix A.
We consider histories that are sequences alterna-
tives labeled by α1, α2, · · · , αn at a series of times
t1, t2, · · · , tn. The probabilities of these are given by
p(αn, · · · , α1) =‖ Pnαn(tn) · · ·P 1α1(t1) |Ψ〉 ‖2 (3.1)
where the P kαk(tk) are Heisenberg picture projections
onto these alternatives. The label k denotes the particu-
lar exhaustive set of exclusive alternatives, αk labels the
particular alternative within the set, and tk is the time.
To conserve on notation, we denote individual histories
by α ≡ (α1, α2, · · · , αn) and denote the corresponding
chains of projections by Cα so that
p(α) =‖ Cα|Ψ〉 ‖2 (3.2)
is a shorthand for (3.1).
6 We use the term quasiclassical realm to emphasize that the clas-
sical behavior is probabilistic and on occasion significantly inter-
rupted by quantum mechanics.
Conditional probabilities for alternatives α given an-
other alternative β are constructed in the usual way
p(α|β) ≡ p(α, β)/p(β) . (3.3)
Most useful probabilities are conditional. Suppose, for
instance, we know certain data d about the universe at a
present time t0 represented by a projection Pd(t0). The
predictions for future histories of the universe given this
data are specified by the conditional probabilities
p(αfut|d) = ‖ CαfutPd(t0)|Ψ〉 ‖
2
‖ Pd(t0)|Ψ〉 ‖2 (3.4)
where the {Cαfut} represent an exhausitive set of alter-
native histories to the future of t0. Similarly, the proba-
bilities for retrodiction of the past are given by
p(βpst|d) =
‖ Pd(t0)Cβpst |Ψ〉 ‖2
‖ Pd(t0)|Ψ〉 ‖2 (3.5)
where {Cβpst} represent an exhaustive set of alternative
histories to the past of t0. In each case, we assume that
the set of histories consisting of Pd and the C’s is deco-
herent.
The alternatives Pd(t0) can refer to the data possessed
by an IGUS at a time t0 along its own history. Simi-
larly, αfut and βpst can refer to data possessed by that
IGUS in the future or past of t0. Thus, it is possible to
provide probabilities that answer questions like “Given
that I observe a tree here today, what is the probability
that there was a tree here yesterday?” or “Given that I
observe a tree here today, what is the probability that I
will observe a tree here tomorrow?”, or even “Given that
I observe a tree here today, what is the probability that
there is a tree here today?” (This the probability that
our observations don’t deceive us).
Like all assertions in a probabilistic theory, those in-
volving he verb ‘to happen’ should always be qualified
by a probability. For instance, from present data that
includes texts giving 55 BC as the date of the Roman
invasion of Britain we would like to infer that Caesar did
invade Britain in 55 BC. But the probability for this is
not unity. There is some probability that the texts are
forgeries, or contain propagating mistakes, or that the
ink on their pages made a quantum transition from a
configuration spelling a different date. If the probability
is sufficiently close to unity we say simply that the Roman
invasion of Britain happened in 55 BC. Similar qualifica-
tions are needed for ‘is happening’ and ‘will happen’.
This need for qualifying ‘happen’ because of probabil-
ities is a trivial observation. Such qualifications are gen-
erally needed in classical physics as well. Probabilities
are inescapable as a practical matter because of igno-
rance of present data or inability to determine classical
evolution. Quantum fluctuations add one more source
of uncertainty which is often negligible in everyday cir-
cumstances, as in probability for the date of the Roman
invasion of Britain. In the next subsection we consider a
more serious need for qualification.
6C. Incompatible Realms
Human IGUSes focus almost exclusively on coarse-
grainings of the quasiclassical realm. Our senses are
adapted to perceive quasiclassical variables and our lan-
guage is adapted to describe quasiclassical histories7.
As we have already mentioned, the quantum universe
exhibits distinct realms which are incompatible in the
sense that there is no finer-grained realm of which they
are coarse-grainings. Questions, answers, predictions,
retrodictions, etc. are all in the context of a particular
realm which must be specified to understand what they
mean.
Consider by way of example the reconstruction of a
past history of the universe from data we have gathered in
the present together with the theory of the initial state8.
As mentioned above, that is accomplished by retrodicting
the probabilities of past events from the given present
data using the conditional probabilities (3.5).
Suppose present data is given in quasiclassical vari-
ables. The most familiar and useful retrodictions from
this data are made using quasiclassical past histories.
With these we retrodict the date 55 BC for the first
Roman invasion of Britain from present textual records.
We use present observations of the planets to reconstruct
their past trajectories. We use fossil records to estimate
that there is a high probability that dinosaurs roamed
the Earth 150 million years ago. We infer that matter
and radiation were in thermal equilibrium at the begin-
ning of the universe from the present values of the Hubble
constant, spatial curvature, and the temperature of the
cosmic background radiation. These are all past histo-
ries that are members of quasiclassical realms based on
coarse-grainings of quasiclassical variables.
But in quantum theory there is no unique past condi-
tioned on given present data. Incompatible past realms
can provide different stories of what happened. A strik-
ing, if artificial, example of this is provided by the three-
box model introduced by Aharonov and Vaidman for a
different purpose [14].
Consider a particle that can be in one of three boxes,
A, B, C in corresponding orthogonal states |A〉, |B〉, and
|C〉. For simplicity, take the Hamiltonian to be zero, and
suppose the system to initially be in the state
|Ψ〉 ≡ 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉+ |C〉) . (3.6)
Suppose for present data at t0 the particle is in the state
|Φ〉 ≡ 1√
3
(|A〉+ |B〉 − |C〉) . (3.7)
7 Explanation for our quasiclassical focus can be sought in the
physical structure of human IGUSes and the origin of that struc-
ture.
8 For more on the reconstruction of the past in quantum mechan-
ics, see [13].
Denote the projection operators on |Φ〉, |A〉, |B〉, |C〉 by
PΦ, PA, PB, PC respectively. Denote by A¯ the negation
of A (“not in box A”) represented by the projection PA¯ =
I−PA. The negations Φ¯, B¯, C¯ and their projections PΦ¯,
PB¯, and PC¯ are similarly defined.
From the present data |Φ〉 and the initial condition
|Ψ〉 let us ask whether the particle was in the box A at a
time earlier than t0. (The exact values of the times are
unimportant since H = 0. Only the order matters.) The
relevant past realm consists of the histories
PΦPA , PΦPA¯ , PΦ¯PA , PΦ¯PA¯ , (3.8)
and is easily checked to decohere exactly. The conditional
probabilities for A and A¯ given Φ can be calculated from
(3.5) with Pd = PΦ and {Cα} = {PA , PA¯}. The result is
p(A|Φ) = 1 , p(A¯|Φ) = 0 . (3.9)
Thus, we can say in this past realm that the event that
the particle was in box A in the past happened.
But an examination of (3.6) and (3.7) shows that both
initial condition and present data are symmetric under
interchange of A and B. Therefore, using the decoherent
set of histories
PΦPB , PΦPB¯ , PΦ¯PB , PΦ¯PB¯ (3.10)
we can compute
p(B|Φ) = 1 , p(B¯|Φ) = 0 . (3.11)
Thus, we can say in this past realm that the event that
the particle was box B happened.
There is no contradiction because the sets of histo-
ries (3.8) and (3.10) are incompatible realms. The finer-
grained set of histories describing both A and B is
PΦPAPB , PΦPAPB¯ , PΦPA¯PB , · · · , etc. (3.12)
But this set does not decohere. The inference “if in A
then not in B” cannot be drawn since there are no con-
sistent probabilities for it.
Eqs. (3.8) and (3.10) do not exhaust the possible
realms defining possible pasts for the present data PΦ.
For example, we could consider
PΦPΨ , PΦPΨ¯ , PΦ¯PΨ , PΦ¯PΨ¯ (3.13)
This is trivially decoherent with easily anticipated prob-
abilities, but also clearly distinct from (3.8) and (3.10).
In this past realm we could say that PΨ happened rather
than anything about the above alternatives.
The usual use of ‘happened’ assumes that there is only
one realm. In a theory that permits incompatible pasts,
its use must be reformed. As with the other conflicts
between human language and fundamental physics dis-
cussed in this paper, there are two routes to improv-
ing precision and clarity. One is to use the language of
physics and speak of the past in terms of the conditional
probabilities in different past realms. The other route
7is to qualify ‘happen’ so it refers to a particular realm.
For instance, in the three-box example we could say that
‘the event that the particle was in box A happened in the
realm that referred to A’ (or whatever other characteri-
zation of (3.8) one prefers) and similarly for B.
If ‘happened’ means high probability for an event in
the past conditioned on certain present data, the above
examples show that different events can have happened
in different incompatible pasts, even seemingly contra-
dictory events. If someone asks you ‘What happened
yesterday?’ you should strictly speaking respond with
the question ‘In what realm?’.
It should be stressed, however, that the same event
cannot have happened in one realm and not have hap-
pened in another. The probability for a past history is
given uniquely by (3.5) in all the realms of which it is a
member. If it is high in one realm, it is high in all the
others. In this sense ‘happened’ is non-contextual.
Needless to say, similar considerations apply to ‘hap-
pening’ and ‘will happen’. We next turn to the implica-
tions of all this for the word ‘reality’.
IV. REALITY
The words ‘real’ and ‘reality’ are used in many differ-
ent ways in human language. In the following we attempt
to draw crude distinctions between a few of these with-
out suggesting that other distinctions are not possible.
The general point is that notions of reality reside in the
models (schemata) that IGUSes construct of the world
around them, both individually and collectively. Differ-
ent models have different notions of reality. Therefore,
when using the words ‘real’ or ‘reality’ it is important for
clarity to specify which model is being referred to.
A. Everyday Physical Reality
Everyday notions of physical reality arise from the
agreement among human IGUSes, both individually and
collectively, on their observations and on the models of
the world (schemata) that they infer from them. These
models are formed from the gathered data by processes
of selection, communication, and schematization, consis-
tent with built-in biases. The models are constantly up-
dated as the IGUSes acquire new information, integrate
it with previous experience, infer new useful regularities,
and check the model against other schemata. The ev-
eryday notions of physical reality reside in these models.
This is the reality of tables and chairs, stars and galaxies,
biological species, fellow humans, and the records of ex-
periments revealing quantum phenomena, among many
other things. These are the notions of reality that human
language evolved to describe and assist in constructing.
Explaining the regularities found in such models is an im-
portant objective of science. The limits of physical reality
are illustrated by the lack of agreement on mirages and
illusions, and by the delusions of schizophrenics who are
said to be ‘out of touch with reality’. In human language,
this everyday physical reality is often what is meant when
the word isused without qualification.
How do we understand the agreement among human
IGUSes on the facts of their physical reality in a quantum
universe characterized fundamentally by the distributed
probabilities of the alternative histories of a vast num-
ber of incompatible realms? The simplest explanation is
that human IGUSes are all making observations utilizing
coarse-grainings of the quasiclassical realms in order to
exploit the quasiclassical regularities that these realms
exhibit. They thus are adapted to develop schemata in
more or less the same way. Occasionally they slip up
as when they are subject to delusions, or see canals on
Mars, or find ghosts under the bed. But they agree, by
and large. Indeed, we could not function in social units
without this agreement; the ability to construct a com-
mon physical reality must have been a highly adaptive
trait. Plausibly, many other IGUSes on Earth, such as
dolphins and ants, make use of similar coarse grainings.
If we find intelligent life on other planets, will they
have the same notion of physical reality that we do? It’s
plausible that many kinds of IGUSes will have evolved
to exploit the regularities of quasiclassical realms as we
have. In that case, we can expect to reach agreement
with them. But could there be IGUSes focused on coarse-
grainings of a distinct, incompatible realm with a cor-
respondingly different notion of physical reality? The
statistics of the schemata of extra-terrestrial IGUSes will
constitute a test of the conjecture of the adaptive utility
of the quasiclassical realms.
Closer to home, we imagine we could construct me-
chanical IGUSes (robots) that have notions of reality
differing from the human kind. Even restricting to in-
put data streams that are coarse grainings of a quasiclas-
sical realm, we imagine that we could construct robots
that create different schemata from that data. For in-
stance the built in biases for selecting what to schema-
tize and the rules for how to schematize could both be
varied. A thermostat is a very simple example of an
IGUS with a restricted schema. It should be possible
to construct IGUses (robots) with schemata that do not
employ our past, present future organization of tempo-
ral information9[10]. Science fiction abounds with robots
that construct different schemata. It is also not beyond
possibilty that we could construct robots utilizing non-
quasiclassical input data streams. Such robots would
consequently have qualitatively different schemata and
9 Our conscious focus on the most recently acquired data is plau-
sibly the reason that the present is sometimes characterized as
more ‘real’ that the imperfectly recorded past and the unknown
future. What is meant presumably is that present data figures
more prominently and accurately in robot’s schema. However,
the ‘NS’ robot of [10] would treat the past and present equally,
and the ‘AB’ robot would have some premonitions of the future.
8qualitatively different notions of everyday reality.
B. The Realities of Physical Theories
As Bohr said, “the task of science is both to extend the
range our experience and reduce it to order” [15]. Ele-
mentary notions of physical reality are extended by fun-
damental physical theories. These are realities that are
agreed to by physicists and reside in physics literature.
Indeed, there is very little, if any, distinction between the
model itself and the notion of reality which follows from
it10.
We hope that the reality of our fundamental theoret-
ical frameworks are objective because they summarize
the universal regularities of the universe independently
of any selection by us. In particular we hope that they
would be agreed to by other IGUSes we might meet that
are interested in physics whether they share our notion
of everyday physical reality or not.
The everyday physical reality described in Section A is
an approximate, particular feature of these fundamental
models arising from particular coarse grainings and par-
ticular initial conditions. Characterizing the emergence
of physical reality already raises interesting questions in
classical physics and more profound ones in quantum me-
chanics.
A fundamental classical model for the universe would
consist of the fine-grained histories of particles and fields
evolving from an initial condition according to determin-
istic laws. These fine-grained histories can be specified
by giving the coordinates and momenta of both particles
and fields as a function of time11. An initial condition
could be specfied by giving a distribution function for
these variables at an initial time. The important point
for present considerations is that the reality of classical
theory consists of a unique family of fine-grained histo-
ries.
The constituents of the everyday notion of physical
reality are not atoms, molecules, and electromagnetic
fields, but rather tables and chairs, stars and galaxies,
etc. more generally the forms, velocities, and locations
of individual objects. Indeed such notions were used by
our species long before atoms, molecules, and fields were
discovered. Rather, everyday physical reality arises from
the fundamental classical model by appropriate coarse-
graining. For instance, coarse-graining by quasiclassical
variables such as the averages over suitable volumes of
densities of approximately conserved quantities such as
10 That is possibly the reason that ‘reality’ is so little discussed in
physics textbooks — it is already implicit in the model under
discussion.
11 More precisely they are specfied by giving these values on a foli-
ating family of spacelike surfaces in a curved spacetime obeying
the Einstein equation when general relativity is taken into ac-
count.
energy, momentum, and number leads to phenomeno-
logical equations of motion such as the Navier-Stokes
equation for a wide class of initial conditions (see, e.g.
[16]). Further coarse-graining is needed to define individ-
ual physical objects such as particular trees. The impor-
tant point is that everyday physical reality is an approxi-
mate feature of classical physics contingent on particular
choices of coarse-graining.
The story of the emergence of everyday physical real-
ity from the quasiclassical realms in quantum theory is
similar to that in classical physics. The coarse-grainings
defining the relevant sets of histories are the same. The
two new features are the following: First the initial quan-
tum state must be such that the set of coarse-grained
histories decoheres. Second, the correlations in time that
define classical determinism are now only approximate
— occuring with high probability in particular initial
states12.
What is very different from classical physics is the re-
ality of the fundamental quantum theory. There are no
non-trivial fine-grained decoherent sets of histories for
quantum theory as there are for classical physics [21].
Coarse-graining is necessary for decoherence, and there
are many different coarse-grainings not all of which are
compatible. As we have already discussed, quantum
theory therefore provides many mutually incompatible
realms of which the quasiclassical ones are a small subset.
The theory does not distinguish between these, although
IGUSes may do so. In the three-box example in Section
III.C, the past realm that refers to box A is no more or
less ‘real’ than the incompatible past realm that refers
to box B. The reality of quantum theory may rather be
said to consist of all the different possible realms13.
To use the word ‘reality’ in the context of quantum
theory without qualification is to risk confusing everyday
physical reality which is constructed from quasiclassical
realms with the reality of quantum theory which consists
of all realms.
C. Other realities
Human IGUSes exhibit a wide range of individual no-
tions of reality that go beyond physical reality by in-
corporating in their schemata the supernatural, preju-
dice, revelation, hearsay, wishful thinking, and the like
along with scientific evidence. Today one can find human
IGUSes of different persuasions on the reality of UFO’s,
paranormal phenomena, and biological evolution. Be-
yond these individual notions, there are many other kinds
of agreed-upon models constructed by human IGUSes,
each defining a notion of reality. For instance, a notion of
12 For some further discussion and models see e.g. [17, 18, 19, 20].
13 The far reaching consequences of this generalization of the reality
of classical theory have been stressed in [22]
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ematicians on axioms which, as Go¨del put it [23], ‘force
themselves on us as being true’14
D. Usage
The above discussion probably does not exhaust the
uses of the word ‘reality’ in human language. But it
does illustrate that its meanings are diverse. What they
seem to have in common is an agreement by at least some
IGUSes on a model for some class of coarse-grained phys-
ical phenomena. This diversity of meanings can lead to
confusion if the word is used without qualification. In
particular it is important to distinguish between every-
day physical reality and the notions of reality provided
fundamental physical theory. That is especially the case
if everyday experience is special and contingent among
many other possibilities as it is in quantum theory. The
trend in fundamental physics today seems to lie in the
direction of increasing disparity between everyday phys-
ical reality and the reality of the fundamental theory . If
that trend continues, maintaining appropriate linguistic
qualifications will become even more necessary for clarity.
V. DISPENSIBLE WORDS
Dispensible words are ones that can be added to or
deleted from an exposition of a physical theory with-
out effecting the theory’s experimentally verifiable pre-
dictions or its utility. Such words can be important for
motivation, for evoking analogies, for building intuition,
and for suggesting future research. In short, they can
help understanding. But they can also be confusing, the
source of false problems, and an obstacle to understand-
ing. Not surprisingly, some dispensible words arise from
natural constructions in human language. Also, not sur-
prisingly, many of the confusing dispensible words occur
in quantum theory.15
It is useful to know when language describing a theory
is dispensible and when it is not. In particular, a question
of whether or not dispensible words are appropriate will
not be settled by experiment.
There is a simple test for dispensible words: Dispense
with them and see if the predictions of the theory are un-
changed. The author has usually found that dispensing
with the dispensibles is a route to clarity. This section
illustrates these ideas with two examples from quantum
mechanics.
14 When we encounter other intelligent beings we can confidently
predict that they will have the same arithmetic that we do. But
will they have ZFC?
15 For one reason this might be so, see [24].
A. Probabilities ‘to happen’
Consider the two sentences, ‘The probability of rain
this afternoon is 80%.’ and ‘The probability for rain to
happen this afternoon is 80%’. To the author these two
sentences mean the same thing in any understanding of
probability of which he is aware. His decision whether or
not to carry an umbrella would be the same under either
assertion. The words ‘to happen’ are dispensible.
Qualifying ‘the probability of A’ so that it becomes ‘the
probability of A to happen’ can be a source of confusion
becaue it suggests to some that ‘happening’ is a physical
process. Indeed, some have held that quantum theory is
incomplete until it explains why, in a set of alternatives
for which it supplies probabilities, one of them ‘happens’
(or is observed). Quantum theory as developed here has
no such mechanism and yet is consistent with all experi-
ment, as far as we know, through the probabilities which
are its only output.
B. Equally real histories
Another candidate for dispensible words is the state-
ment, ‘all the histories in a given realm are equally real’.16
This statement has a simple meaning if ‘real’ is under-
stood to refer to the theoretical model — the reality of
the theory as discussed in Section IV.C. In that context
the statement could be rephrased as ‘quantum mechan-
ics does not distinguish between the histories in a given
realm except by their probabilities.’ Indeed, using the
word ‘real’ in this sense, it would be possible to correctly
say that ‘all the realms of quantum theory are equally
real’. This could be similarly rephrased as ‘quantum the-
ory does not distinguish between different realms’. In
each case, the first statement can be replaced by the sec-
ond without affecting the predictions of the theory for
experiment. The second formulations are easier to un-
derstand for many physicists. But all these statements
are dispensible as the exposition of quantum theory given
in this article shows.
Deutsch [25] especially has stressed the naturalness
and interpretative value of the equal status of histories
in a given realm, for instance, for understanding the
power of quantum computation. Such advantages, how-
ever great, do not alter that fact that words like ‘all the
other histories are equally real’ can be dispensed with
without affecting the experimental implications of the
theory.
As discussed in Section IV, the linguistic difficulty with
using the word ‘real’ is that it can mean different things in
different circumstances even in physics. Maintaining that
16 This is a translation of the statement ‘all the other worlds are
equally real’ where what is meant by world is what is called
history here even if it consists only of an alternative at one time.
10
‘all the histories in a set are equally real’ risks confusion
unless the meaning of ‘real’ is explained. The author’s
experience is that otherwise it can be confused with the
everyday physical reality discussed in Section IV.A . The
resulting conflict can be an obstacle for some to accepting
Everett’s powerful and natural idea of taking the state of
the universe seriously.
VI. ADVICE
The aim of fundamental physics is to find the laws
governing the reqularities exhibited universally by all
physical systems, without exception, without qualifica-
tion, and without approximation. The search for these
laws has been seriously underway at least since the time
of Newton. Classical mechanics, Newtonian gravity,
Maxwell’s electrodynamics, the atomic theory of mat-
ter, special and general relativity, quantum field theory,
superstring theory, the quantum theory of geometry, and
quantum cosmology are just some of the milestones in the
history of this search. As new regimes of experiment and
observation have been explored, more general theoretical
frameworks have evolved. Old theories have become ef-
fective theories applicable in limited circumstances of the
extended context.
Excess theoretical baggage is typically shed in this pro-
cess of generalization [26]. Ideas that were once accepted
as fundamental, general, and inescapable have come to be
seen as consequent, special, and dispensible. Examples
from the history of physics are an Earth centered cos-
mology, a single universal time, an exact second law of
thermodynamics, fixed Euclidean spatial geometry, and a
quantum mechanics restricted to measurements. These
ideas were not true general features of the world, but
only perceived to be general because of our special uni-
verse, our special place in it, and the limited range of our
experience.
Over this history, the models provided by fundamen-
tal physical theory have moved far beyond our everyday
notions of physical reality.17 The evolution of physical
theory beyond everyday notions of physical reality has
complicated its description using a human language that
is adapted to that everyday reality. That has been the
subject of this essay.
17 Excess baggage in the language of physics is also typically shed
in the process of extension and generalization of physical theory.
Indeed, the relationship between the languages of two effective
theories often presents problems similar to those between the
human language and the language of physics that we have dis-
cussed. For example, applying the language of classical physics
to quantum mechanical situations can lead to paradoxes which
can be resolved by sticking to the language of quantum theory
[4, 27]. By and large, however these physics linguistic problems
have not caused much difficulty and, in any event, are not the
subject of this essay.
By way of conclusion the author offers a few words of
advice on routes to clarity in the face of the disparity
between the languages of fundamental physics and that
of human IGUSes. This advice is not directed to how to
find a fundamental theory. Rather is is only about how
to deal with the conflicts with human language that may
arise.
• Identify Theoretical Excess Baggage. Remember
that ideas that were fundamental and obvious in
one theory can become emergent and dispensible
in a more general one. The idea that there is a
unique past, present, and future defined by physics
is one example that we have discussed. Another is
the idea that there should be a unique theoretical
reality specified by one decoherent set of alterna-
tive fine-grained histories rather than many differ-
ent ones that may be incompatible and yet fit into
a consistent theoretical framework.
• Identify Linguistic Excess Baggage. Remember
that human language can contain tacit assumptions
that reflect the limited context in which it evolved.
We have discussed examples associated with ‘to
happen’ and ‘reality’. Linguistic excess baggage
can be dispensed with in favor of the more pre-
cise language of physics. To clearly discuss quan-
tum theory, learn to speak the language of quantum
mechanics. Alternatively linguistic excess baggage
can be qualified so that tacit assumptions become
explicit.
• Identify Dispensible Language. Remember that an
exposition of a theory can contain language that
can be dispensed with without affecting its exper-
imental predictions. Examples are the use of ‘to
happen’ to qualify probabilities and the use of ‘all
equally real’ to qualify sets of histories. The author
often finds it useful to drop dispensible language in
introducing quantum theory. That is especially the
case if the audience carry their own linguistic bag-
gage which conflicts with the dispensible language
making it an obstacle to understanding and accep-
tance. However, don’t forget that adding interpre-
tative but dispensible language can be an impor-
tant route to insight, motivation, understanding,
and generalization. Either way, it is important to
recognize when language is dispensible and when it
is not. In arguments concerning the interpretation
of the theory one then understands which statments
are experimentally verifiable and which are not.
• Beware of Introspection. Remember that human
beings are physical systems in the universe that
have a long, specific, evolutionary history. That
evolution is consistent with the universal laws of
physics. But the present nature of these IGUSes
has far more to do with the frozen accidents of their
evolution than with those fundamental laws. As a
consequence, introspection is unlikely to be a good
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guide to their character. That is especially the case
if introspection is seen to require precise representa-
tions in the fundamental theory for constructions of
the human language. To take an extreme example,
some have concluded from the strong impression of
‘now’ held by human IGUSes that the fundamental
theory must incorporate it despite the overwhelm-
ing body of experimental evidence against preferred
frames with figures of merit approaching 10−21 [28],
and despite the possibility of constructing IGUSes
which do not prefer the present [10]. Rather, ‘now’
can be seen as a feature of how certain IGUSes pro-
cess temporal information as described in Section
II.
• Beware of Agendas. Remember that the basic cri-
teria for physical theory are logical consistency and
consistency with experiment. Agendas for physical
theory motivate research as in the quest for unifica-
tion or a selection principle that would distinguish
one realm from all others [22, 29]. But if a theory
that is logically consistent and consistent with ex-
periment disagrees with your agenda that should
not be called a problem for the theory, it is more
likely to be a problem with your agenda.
It seems likely that there are limits to quantum theory
and the validity of its principle of superposition as there
have been for every other candidate for a fundamental
theory to date. The remarkable fact about the history
of this most successful of all physical theories is that,
despite the limited range over which it has been exper-
imentally verified, there are no alternative theories that
are consistent these experiments, consistent with the rest
of modern physics, but which differ their predictions in
domains not yet tested. As Steve Weinberg puts it: “It
is striking that it has not so far been possible to find a
logically consistent theory that is close to quantum me-
chanics other than quantum mechanics itself” [30].
Alternatives to quantum theory would be of great in-
terest if only to guide experiment. Given the trend in
the development of fundamental theory, it is very possi-
ble that the disparity between human language and the
language of fundamental physics will increase as quantum
theory is replaced or extended. If that is the case, care-
ful analyses of the relationship between human language
and the language of physics of the kind sketched all too
superficially in this essay will be increasingly important
for clarity of understanding.
APPENDIX A: THE QUANTUM MECHANICS
OF A CLOSED SYSTEM
This appendix gives a simplified, bare-bones account of
some essential elements of the modern synthesis of ideas
constituting the quantum mechanics of closed systems
[3, 4, 5] using the model closed box described in Section
III.A.
1. Realms
The most general objective of a quantum theory of a
closed system is the prediction of probabilities for the
individual members of exhaustive sets of coarse-grained
alternative time histories of the system. For instance, we
might be interested in alternative histories of the center
of mass of the Earth in its progress around the Sun, or
in histories of the correlation between the registrations of
measuring apparatus and a measured subsystem. Alter-
natives at one moment of time can always be reduced to
a set of yes/no questions. For example, alternative posi-
tions of the Earth’s center of mass can be reduced to ask-
ing, “Is it in this region – yes or no?”, “Is it in that region
– yes or no?”, etc. An exhaustive set of yes/no alterna-
tives is represented in the Heisenberg picture by an ex-
haustive set of orthogonal projection operators {Pα(t)},
α = 1, 2, 3 · · · . These satisfy
∑
α
Pα(t) = I, and Pα(t)Pβ(t) = δαβPα(t) (A.1)
showing that they represent an exhaustive set of exclusive
alternatives. In the Heisenberg picture, the operators




The state |Ψ〉 is unchanging in time.
An important kind of set of histories is specified by
a series of sets of alternatives {P 1α1(t1)}, {P 2α2(t2)}, · · · ,{Pnαn(tn)} at a sequence of times t1 < t2 < · · · < tn. The
sets at distinct times can differ, and are distinguished
by the superscript on the P ’s. For instance, projections
on ranges of position might be followed by projections
on ranges of momentum, etc18. An individual history
cα in such a set is a particular sequence of alternatives
(α1, α2, · · · , αn) ≡ α and is represented by the corre-
sponding chain of projections called a class operator
Cα ≡ Pnαn(tn) · · ·Pα1(t1) . (A.3)
Such a set of histories is generally coarse-grained because
alternatives are specified at some times and not at every
time, and because the alternatives at a given time are
projections onto subspaces with dimension greater than
one and not projections onto a complete set of states.
Fine-grained sets of histories consist of one-dimensional
projections at each and every time.
Operations of fine- and coarse-graining may be defined
on sets of histories. A set of histories {cα} may be coarse-
grained by partitioning it into exhaustive and exclusive
18 In general realistic sets of histories will be branch dependent with
sets of projections at a given time depending on the particular se-
quence of previous alternatives, but we ignore this in the present
simplified exposition.
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classes c¯α¯, α¯ = 1, 2, · · · . Each class consists of some num-
ber of histories in the finer-grained set, and every finer-
grained history is in some class. Suppose, for example,
that the position of the Earth’s center of mass is spec-
ified by dividing space into cubical regions of a certain
size. A coarser-grained description of position could con-
sist of larger regions made up of unions of the smaller
ones. Fine-graining is the inverse operation of dividing
sets of histories up into smaller classes. The class oper-
ator C¯α¯ for a history in a coarse-graining of a set whose






where the sum defining C¯α¯ for the class c¯α¯ is the sum over
the Cα for all finer-grained histories contained within it.
For any set of histories {cα}, there is a branch state
vector for each history in the set defined by
|Ψα〉 = Cα|Ψ〉 . (A.5)
When probabilities can be consistently assigned to the
individual histories in a set, they are given by
p(α) =‖ |Ψα〉 ‖2=‖ Cα|Ψ〉 ‖2 . (A.6)
However, quantum interference prevents consistent
probabilities from being assigned to every set of alter-
native histories that may be described. The two-slit ex-
periment provides an elementary example: An electron
emitted by a source can pass through either of two slits
on its way to detection at a farther screen. It is not possi-
ble to consistently assign probabilities to the two histories
distinguished by which slit the electron goes through. Be-
cause of interference, the probability to arrive at a point
on the screen would not be the sum of the probabili-
ties to arrive there by going through each of the slits.
In quantum theory, probabilities are squares of ampli-
tudes and the square of a sum is not generally the sum
of the squares. On the other hand, if other interactions
of the electron destroy the interference between the two
histories (as when a measurement determines which slit
it passes through) then probabilities can be consistently
assigned.
Negligible interference between the branches of a set
〈Ψα|Ψβ〉 ≈ 0 , α 6= β (A.7)
is a sufficient condition for the probabilities (A.6) to be
consistent with the rules of probability theory. Specif-
ically, as a consequence of the decoherence condition
(A.7), the probabilities (A.6) obey the most general form





for any coarse-graining {c¯α¯} of the {cα}. Sets of histories
obeying (A.7) are said to (medium) decohere.19 These
are sets for which quantum mechanics makes predictions.
They are determined through (A.6) by the Hamiltonian
H and the quantum state of the universe |Ψ〉. We use
the term realm as a synonym for a decoherent set of al-
ternative coarse-grained histories.
A coarse-graining of a decoherent set is again deco-
herent. A fine-graining of a decoherent set risks losing
decoherence.
An important mechanism of decoherence is the dissipa-
tion of phase coherence between branches into variables
not followed by the coarse-graining. Consider by way of
example, a dust grain in a superposition of two positions
deep in interstellar space [35]. In our universe, about
1011 cosmic background photons scatter from the dust
grain each second. The two positions become correlated
with different, nearly orthogonal states of the photons.
Coarse-grainings that follow only the position of the dust
grain at a few times therefore correspond to branch state
vectors that are nearly orthogonal and satisfy (A.7). The
orthogonality is approximate but in realistic situations
sufficient to define consistent probabilities well beyond
the standard to which they can be checked or, indeed,
the physical situation modeled [36].
Measurements and observers play no fundamental role
in this general formulation of quantum theory. Measure-
ment situations can, of course, be described [36, 37]. In a
typical measurement situation, one subsystem of the uni-
verse (the measured subsystem) interacts with another
(the apparatus). A variable of the measured subsystem,
not otherwise decohering, becomes correlated with a vari-
able of the apparatus which decoheres because of its in-
teraction with the rest of the universe. The correlation
thus effects the decoherence of the measured variables so
that probabilities can be predicted for its values. With
suitable idealizations and assumptions, probabilities for
the measured outcomes are given to an excellent approx-
imation by usual textbook quantum theory. But, in a
set of histories where they decohere, probabilities can be
assigned to the position of the Moon when it is not receiv-
ing the attention of observers and to the values of density
fluctuations in the early universe when there were neither
measurements taking place nor observers to carry them
out.
The probabilities of the histories of the possible deco-
herent sets of coarse-grained histories and the conditional
probabilities constructed from them are the totality of
predictions of the quantum mechanics of a closed system
given the Hamiltonian H and initial state |Ψ〉.
19 For a discussion of the linear positive, weak, medium, and strong
decoherence conditions, see [31, 32, 33]. However, as L. Dio´si
has shown [34], medium decoherence is the weakest of this chain




Coarse-graining is generally necessary for decoherence.
There are only trivial decoherent sets of completely fine-
grained histories [21].
A completely fine-grained set of histories can be coarse-
grained in many different ways to yield a decoherent
set whose probabilities can be employed in the pro-
cesses of prediction and retrodiction. Further, there are
many different completely fine-grained sets to start from
corresponding to the different possible choices of one-
dimensional projections at each time arising from dif-
ferent complete sets of commuting observables. Once
coarse-grained enough to achieve decoherence, further
coarse graining preserves it. Some decoherent sets can
be organized into families connected by the operations of
fine and coarse graining. Such sets are said to be com-
patible.
Realms for which there is no common finer-grained de-
coherent sets are incompatible. We may not draw in-
ferences by combining probabilities from incompatible
realms20. That would implicitly assume that there are
the probabilities of a finer-grained description which is
not available. Incompatible realms provide different de-
scriptions of the universe. All of the totality of incom-
patible realms are necessary to give a complete account
of the universe because they are, in principle, equally
available for exhibiting regularities and constructing ex-
planations. Quantum theory does not distinguish one of
these realms over another without further criteria.
Incompatibility is not inconsistency in the sense of
making different predictions for the same history. The
probability of a history cα is given by (A.6) in all the
realms of which it is a member.
3. Quasiclassical Realms
While quantum theory permits a great many in-
compatible descriptions of a closed system by different
realms, we as human observers utilize mainly realms that
are coarse-grainings of one family of compatible sets —
the quasiclassical realms of everyday experience. These
are the sets of decoherent histories whose probabilities
manifest the classical regularities of the universe that are
exploitable in our various pursuits, in particular, to get
food, reproduce, avoid destruction, and achieve recogni-
tion. These are the sets of histories defined by quasi-
classical alternatives which our perception is adapted to
distinguish.
Quasiclassical realms are defined a coarse-graining
specifying ranges of values of the variables of classical
20 As the work of R. Griffiths [4] especially has shown, essentially
all inconsistencies alleged against consistent histories quantum
mechanics arise from violating this logical prohibition.
physics. These include the averages over small volumes of
approximately conserved quantities such as energy, mo-
mentum, and various kind of particle species. We call
such variables quasiclassical variables. The useful proper-
ties of quasiclassical realms follow from the approximate
conservation of the variables that define them. In par-
ticular quasiclassical realms exhibit correlations in time
governed by the approximate deterministic laws of mo-
tion of classical physics. In our quantum universe, clas-
sical laws are applicable over a wide range of time,place,
scale, and epoch.
More specifically, by a quasiclassical realm we mean an
exhaustive set of mutually exclusive coarse-grained alter-
native histories, that obey a realistic principle of decoher-
ence, that consist largely of related but branch-dependent
projections onto ranges of quasiclassical variables at a
succession of times, with individual histories exhibiting
patterns of correlation implied by closed sets of effective
equations of motion subject to frequent small fluctuations
and occasional major branchings (as in measurement sit-
uations). By a family of quasiclassical realms we mean
a set of compatible ones that are all coarse grainings of
a common one. Thus defined, the quasiclassical realms
are a feature of our universe that arise from its quantum
state and dynamics which we are adapted to exploit [21].
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